





We examine the impact of abatement taxes on the pollution level in
a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demon-
strate that an increase in abatement taxes could trigger a regime-switch
from joint ventures to Cournot competition, causing the pollution level
to increase. Moreover, abatement taxes can implement the ﬁrst best
outcome if and only if the industry is not too polluting. In case it is,
the second best level of taxes may or may not equal the optimal tax
under either joint venture, or Cournot competition.
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In this paper we examine the impact of environmental policy on the
level of pollution in a dirty industry. We consider a duopoly framework
where the ﬁrms endogenously decide whether to form a joint venture,
or not. The emphasis is on examining the interaction between environ-
mental policy, market structure, and the level of pollution.
Our decision to study joint ventures is motivated by the dramatic in-
crease in the rate of joint venture formation over the last few decades.1 In
fact, with most less developed countries (LDCs) moving towards liber-
alization, joint ventures are of great interest to policy makers in LDCs.
On the one hand, joint ventures act as a vehicle for attracting for-
eign multinationals (MNCs). On the other hand, in the recent debates
over the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and the formation of diﬀerent
trade blocks like the single European market and NAFTA, concerns were
raised that liberalization, with all its consequent fallouts, might damage
the environment. Thus given the growing importance of joint ventures
as business organizations, especially in LDCs, it is of interest to examine
the interaction between environmental policy and joint ventures.
This paper also has a purely theoretical motivation, namely to study
the eﬀect of environmental policy in an oligopolistic market with an en-
dogenously determined market structure. In the analysis of environmen-
tal policy, the assumption of a competitive product market is the most
common one.2 Though there is some literature which assumes that the
product market is monopolistic,3 until recently much less attention has
been given to the case of oligopoly.4
Most of the literature with an oligopolistic market structure, how-
ever, assumes that the market structure is exogenously given. This is a
1reasonable assumption if the ﬁrms are protected by signiﬁcant barriers
to entry. In the absence of such entry barriers, however, it is, perhaps,
more reasonable to assume that the market structure is endogenous. In
that case we would like to argue that policy conclusions that hold with
an exogenously given market structure, need not hold when the market
structure is endogenous. In our model the endogeneity of the market
structure arises since whether a joint venture forms or not is decided by
the ﬁrms themselves.
We develop a simple theory of joint venture formation that is based
on two ingredients, synergy and moral hazard. In joint ventures involv-
ing a foreign MNC and a domestic ﬁrm from a LDC, it has often been
observed that the MNC has better access to capital, technical knowhow,
management practices etc., whereas the domestic ﬁrm has better access
to labour, knowledge of local bureaucratic policies, marketing channels
etc.5 Thus if a joint venture forms then the MNC will supply capital,
and the domestic ﬁrm will supply labour to the joint venture,6 leading
to a synergistic reduction in costs.
The second ingredient of the theory is moral hazard. This arises out
of the fact that the amount of capital and labour supplied by the parent
ﬁrms to the joint venture is not veriﬁable, and hence cannot be written
into the contract. Hence the ﬁrms choose the level of input so as to
maximise their own proﬁt, rather than that of the joint venture. This
leads to a free rider problem so that the level of input supply is less than
optimum.
Thus joint venture formation has two advantages over Cournot com-
petition. First, there is the gain due to synergy, and second, by forming
a joint venture the ﬁrms can avoid dissipation of rents. However, the
moral hazard problem implies that joint venture formation involves some
costs as well. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects there
can be either joint venture formation, or Cournot competition.
We examine a dirty industry where production leads to pollution, the
level of pollution being monotonically related to the level of output. The
government uses several policy measures (e.g. imposing emission taxes
etc.) so as to control the pollution. All these policy measures create
an abatement cost for the ﬁrms. Clearly the stricter the governmental
policy, the higher is the abatement cost.
2We then brieﬂy summarise our main results. Our analysis shows that
the pollution level depends on both government regulation and market
structure. If government regulation is very strict, then Cournot com-
petition involves lesser pollution compared to joint venture formation.
Whereas if governmental regulation is very weak, then joint venture
formation involves less pollution. Moreover, under strict government
regulation, the ﬁrms will opt for Cournot competition, whereas under
weak government regulation, the ﬁrms opt for joint venture formation.
Interestingly we ﬁnd that if the synergistic eﬀect is large, then stricter
governmental regulations could lead to an increase in the level of pollu-
tion. In this case an increase in government regulation could lead to a
regime switch from joint venture to Cournot competition. As the indus-
try becomes more competitive, there is an increase in aggregate output
and hence in pollution. Clearly, the result is driven by the endogeneity
of the market structure, and buttresses our earlier contention that while
analysing environmental policy, the issue of market structure needs to
be addressed very carefully.
The regime switch result is also of interest by itself since, in a study
of the ﬁrst 200 Fortune 500 companies by Zanetti and Abate (1993), it
is argued that in industrialised countries big corporations often respond
to environmental policy through organizational innovations. Moreover,
there is some evidence that even very high level of abatement taxes may
fail to reduce pollution levels suﬃciently.7 Our analysis suggests that
one possible explanation could be that such high level of abatement
taxes causes a switch to a more polluting market structure.
If, however, the synergistic eﬀect is small, then we ﬁnd that the level
of pollution decreases monotonically as government regulation becomes
stricter.
Turning to the welfare analysis we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst best outcome
always involves joint venture formation. We then examine if the ﬁrst
best outcome can be implemented when the government can only set
the abatement tax. We ﬁnd that if the industry is relatively clean, then
the ﬁrst best outcome can be implemented by setting the abatement
tax appropriately. However, if the industry is very polluting, then the
ﬁrst best outcome cannot be implemented. Given a market structure,
we demonstrate that the optimal abatement tax is always less than the
marginal social damage.8 Finally, we solve for the second best outcome
3when the ﬁrst best outcome cannot be implemented. Interestingly, the
second best abatement tax may be diﬀerent from the optimal tax under
both joint venture and Cournot competition, when the market structure
is exogenously given. However, it is always less than the marginal social
damage.
We then brieﬂy relate our work in this paper to the existing litera-
ture.
First consider the case where the market structure is exogenously
given. In an n-ﬁrm Cournot framework, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas
(1996) show that an increase in emission tax decreases the output level
and increases abatement expenses. Moreover, the optimal tax is less
than marginal damages. Conrad and Wang (1993) solves for the eﬀects
of the emission tax on the output of an oligopolistic industry. In contrast
to the above models, Carraro and Soubeyran (1996), Ulph (1996a) and
Ulph (1996b), among others, examine the impact of emission taxes when
the ﬁrms are heterogenous.
Next consider the case where the market structure is endogenous. In
a homogeneous product industry with free entry, Katsoulacos and Xepa-
padeas (1995) show that the optimal emission tax may exceed marginal
environmental damages. Clearly, the framework adopted by Katsoula-
cos and Xepapadeas (1995) is very diﬀerent from that in our paper. To
the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the only one that ex-
amines the interaction between environmental policy, market structure,
and the level of pollution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe the basic framework. Section 3 contains the positive part
of the analysis. The welfare analysis is discussed in section 4. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
II. The Model
The market comprises two ﬁrms, one multinational (denoted by ﬁrm
1) and one domestic (denoted by ﬁrm 2), producing a homogenous prod-
uct.9
4The market demand function is given by
q = a − p, (1)
where a (> 0) is the parameter of market size.
There are two factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L).
Recall that capital here is a shorthand for all the inputs supplied by
the MNC, while labour is a shorthand for all the inputs supplied by the
domestic ﬁrm. The production function of both the ﬁrms are taken to




Let the per unit wage and rental cost for the i-th ﬁrm be wi and ri
(respectively). We assume that the MNC has cheaper access to capital,
while the domestic ﬁrm has cheaper access to labour. Thus
r1 < r2 and w1 > w2. (3)
For simplicity we assume that the game is entirely symmetric, so
that
r1 = w2 = c, and r2 = w1 = b,where b > c. (4)
The assumption b > c reﬂects the fact that joint venture formation
leads to a synergy in the cost structure. Thus if c is small compared to
b, then we say that the synergistic eﬀect is large. If c is close to b, then
we say that the synergistic eﬀect is small.
Given the production function, it is standard to show that the cost
function of the ith ﬁrm, Ci(qi) is linear in the level of output :
Ci(qi) = 2
√
bcqi, where i = 1,2. (5)
We formalise the abatement cost as a linear function of output
Ai(qi) = Aqi, (6)
where A is the abatement cost parameter.10 This is a linear version
of the abatement cost function used by Barrett (1994). For technical
reasons we assume that A < a − 4c.
We consider a simple two stage game.
5Stage 1. The ﬁrms sequentially decide whether to opt for Cournot
competition, or joint venture formation. There is joint venture forma-
tion only if both the forms opt for it.
Stage 2. In case there is Cournot competition, the ﬁrms simultane-
ously decide on their level of output. In case a joint venture forms, the
ﬁrms simultaneously decide on the level of input to supply to the joint
venture, K in case of the MNC and L in case of the domestic ﬁrm.
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game.
Joint Venture. Under a joint venture the MNC supplies capital, and
the domestic ﬁrm supplies labour, so as to take advantage of synergistic
eﬀects. However, because of moral hazard problems, the partner ﬁrms
cannot write a contract over the amount of labour and capital that is
to be supplied to the joint venture. The contract only speciﬁes that the
gross proﬁt is to be equally divided among the two partner ﬁrms. The
input costs are borne by the ﬁrm that supplies the input. Note that the
moral hazard problem creates a cost for joint venture formation.11

















2 − A] − cL. (8)
Since the input levels under a joint venture are not contractible, we
solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game, where the MNC and the
domestic ﬁrm simultaneously decide on how much capital and labour














































2] − c = 0. (10)
It is easy to see that the equilibrium will be symmetric in the sense
that K = L.13 Clearly, given symmetry, the equilibrium is unique.
Solving equations (9) and (10) explicitly we ﬁnd that:
b K = b L = b q =
a − A − 4c
2
, (11)
6where ˆ K, ˆ L and ˆ q denote the equilibrium levels of capital, labour and
output respectively.




(a − A)(a − A − 4c). (12)
Cournot Competition. We then examine the outcome under Cournot
competition. Letting Pi denote the proﬁt functions of the two ﬁrms
under Cournot competition
Pi = (a − q1 − q2)qi − 2(bc)
1
2qi − Aqi, i = 1,2. (13)
Thus the reaction functions are given by14
∂Pi
∂qi
= (a − qi − qj) − qi − 2(bc)
1
2 − A = 0, i = 1,2. (14)
From equation (14) it is standard to show that in equilibrium q1 = q2.
Letting qi denote the equilibrium output level of the i-th ﬁrm
q1 = q2 = q =









(a − A − 2(bc)
1
2)2. (16)
From equations (11) and (15) we have the following
Observation. Under both joint venture and Cournot competition,
the equilibrium level of aggregate output, and hence pollution, is decreas-
ing in A.
III. The Analysis
We begin by comparing the level of pollution under joint venture
and Cournot competition. Since the level of pollution is monotonically
related to the level of output, it is suﬃcient to compare the aggregate
output level under joint venture and Cournot competition.
7From equations (11) and (15), the aggregate output under joint ven-
ture exceeds that under Cournot competition only if
A > a + 12c − 8(bc)
1
2 = b A. (17)
Summarising the above discussion we obtain our ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1. Cournot competition involves lesser emission com-
pared to that under joint venture formation if and only if A > b A,
i.e. government regulation is strict enough in the sense that A is large
enough.
We then examine whether the ﬁrms would prefer to opt for joint ven-
ture or Cournot competition. Obviously the ﬁrms opt for joint venture
provided b J ≥ P.15 Hence from equations (12) and (16) it follows that
a joint venture forms provided
(a − A)2 − 4(a − A)[9c − 8(bc)
1
2] − 32bc ≥ 0. (18)
Next, let Z(A) denote the L.H.S. of equation (18). Hence
Z(A) = (a − A)2 − 4(a − A)[9c − 8(bc)
1
2] − 32bc, (19)
and Z0(A) = 2[A − a + 2{9c − 8(bc)
1
2)}]. (20)
Clearly Z(A) is decreasing in A.16 Hence there exists some A∗ such
that equation (18) holds only if A ≤ A∗. (See Figure 1).17
Summarising the above discussion we obtain our next proposition:
Proposition 2. For A > A∗, ﬁrms opt for Cournot competition.
Whereas for A ≤ A∗, ﬁrms opt for joint venture.
While the welfare analysis will be taken up in the next section,
Propositions 1 and 2 allow us to make some preliminary remarks. Let
us suppose that environmental degradation is the primary concern of
the government. In that case we ﬁnd that there is no conﬂict between a
socially desirable market structure and the private incentive to sustain a
market structure, at least for relatively extreme values of A. When A is
high enough, the ﬁrms prefer Cournot competition and pollution is also
lower under Cournot competition. Similarly, when A is low enough,
ﬁrms prefer joint venture formation and the level of pollution is also
lower under a joint venture.
8Let I denote the incentive for joint venture formation, so that I =
b J −P. We then decompose the eﬀects of a change in A on I, into three
components, the synergistic eﬀect, the moral hazard eﬀect and the rent
dissipation eﬀect. This allows us to arrive at the intuition behind the
regime switch from joint venture to Cournot competition.
Observe that I can be re-written as follows:






− π] + [π − P]. (21)
Here M represents the aggregate monopoly proﬁt of the joint venture
when there are no moral hazard problems, i.e. when the parent ﬁrms
can write a veriﬁable contract over the amount of inputs to be supplied





. Finally π represents the
Cournot equilibrium proﬁt of the two ﬁrms when they can access both
the inputs cheaply. Hence π = 1
9(a − A − 2c)2.
Consider the ﬁrst term in square brackets, [ b J − M
2 ]. Note that b J rep-
resents joint venture proﬁts when the moral hazard problem is present
and M represents joint venture proﬁts when there are no moral hazard












Thus the moral hazard eﬀect is independent of A.
Next consider the second term in square brackets, [M
2 −π]. Note that
this represents the diﬀerence between monopoly and Cournot proﬁts,
when under Cournot competition both the ﬁrms are as eﬃcient as the







(a − A − 2c)2 −
1
9
(a − A − 2c)2 =
1
72
(a − A − 2c)2. (23)
Clearly the rent dissipation eﬀect is decreasing in A.
Finally consider the last term in square brackets, [π −P]. Note that
this term measures the diﬀerence in Cournot proﬁts between ﬁrms that
are eﬃcient and ﬁrms that are ineﬃcient. Thus this term is a measure















9So the synergistic eﬀect is also decreasing in A.
Note that a joint venture forms if, and only if the second and the
third eﬀects outweigh the ﬁrst. Moreover, observe that with an increase
in A (induced by stricter government regulation) both the synergistic
and the rent-dissipation eﬀect decreases, whereas the moral hazard eﬀect
is independent of A. Thus joint venture becomes less attractive com-
pared to Cournot competition as government regulation gets stricter.
We then identify the parameter conﬁgurations under which a regime
switch is more likely. Observe that from equation (18) one can write
that






bc + 72bc. (25)
We can use the fact that Z0(A) < 0 to argue that the square root term
must take the negative sign.18







bc + 72bc. (26)
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. 25c ≥ 16b, i.e. 15c−12
√
bc ≥ 0. Hence, in equation (26), the
right hand side is strictly negative, while the left hand side is positive.
This in turn implies that b A ≥ A∗.
Case 2. 25c < 16b i.e. 15c − 12
√
bc < 0. Hence, in equation (26),
the left hand side is strictly negative. Therefore, b A ≥ A∗, if and only if
11c + 18b ≥ 54
√
bc. (27)
Thus when the diﬀerence between b and c is very large i.e. the synergistic
eﬀect is very large, then b A ≥ A∗. Whereas if the synergistic eﬀect is very
small (the extreme case is when b = c) then b A < A∗.
We then turn to the central problem of this section, i.e. to solve
for the level of output as a function of A, when the market structure is
endogenous. There are two diﬀerent cases to consider.
Case 1. b A > A∗.
10Note that for A ≤ A∗, the ﬁrms opt for joint venture formation,
whereas for A∗ < A < b A, the outcome involves Cournot competition
(see Proposition 2). Moreover, at A∗, the level of pollution is greater
under Cournot competition (since b A > A∗). Thus the level of pollution
is monotonically declining in A (see Proposition 1), except for an upward
jump at A = A∗. (See Figure 2).
Case 2. b A < A∗.
Note that at A∗, the level of pollution is lower under joint venture
(since b A < A∗). Thus the level of pollution is monotonically declining
in A (see Proposition 1), except for a downward jump at A = A∗. (See
Figure 3).19
Summarising the above discussion we obtain
Proposition 3. (i) For b A > A∗, the relation between the abatement
cost A and the level of pollution is non-monotonic. In fact, the level of
pollution is monotonically declining in A, except for an upward jump at
A = A∗.
(ii) For b A < A∗, the level of pollution is monotonically decreasing in
A, with a downward jump at A = A∗.
Note that Proposition 3(i) demonstrates that an increase in the level
of abatement costs (i.e. A) could lead to an increase in the level of
pollution. This result depends on the fact that the market structure is
endogenous. As A increases from A∗ − , to A∗ + , there is a regime
switch from joint venture to Cournot competition (see Figure 2). Thus
the level of output and hence pollution goes up as the market structure
becomes more competitive. Hence as governmental policy becomes more
strict, the level of pollution may, in fact, increase.
IV. The Optimal Abatement Tax
We ﬁrst solve for the ﬁrst best outcome. This exercise is carried out
under two premises. First, the government can dictate which market
structure to follow. Second, the government can dictate the input level
of each ﬁrm.
11The solution is divided into two parts. We ﬁrst solve for the ﬁrst
best outcome when the market structure is exogenously given. We then
solve for the ﬁrst best outcome when the government can dictate the
market structure as well.
Let the social damage function from pollution be given by
D(q1 + q2) = µ(q1 + q2)2, (28)
where µ denotes the social damage parameter. Thus, for a given level
of output, greater is µ, greater is the social damage.
We ﬁrst solve for the ﬁrst best outcome under Cournot competition.
Cournot Competition: We assume that the welfare is utilitarian in
form. Thus it is the sum total of producers’ surplus, consumers’ sur-
plus, the governments’ income from the abatement tax, and the social
damage. While calculating the producers’ surplus, we assume that the
whole of the MNC proﬁt is re-invested in the domestic country (or is
paid out to the (domestic) workers as bonus, etc.). Thus the producers’
surplus includes the proﬁt of both the ﬁrms.20 Hence welfare under
Cournot competition
WCC = (a − q1 − q2 − 2
√
bc)(q1 + q2) +
(q1 + q2)2
2
− µ(q1 + q2)2. (29)
Note that the term
(q1+q2)
2
2 denotes the consumers’ surplus (since
the aggregate output is q1 + q2 and the demand function is of the form
q = a − p). Moreover, since the abatement tax is a transfer from the
producers to the government it does not ﬁgure in the welfare function.
The ﬁrst order condition is given by
∂WCC
∂qi
= a − q1 − q2 − 2
√
bc − 2µ(q1 + q2) = 0, i = 1,2. (30)
From equation (30), it is clear that the outcome is symmetric. Hence












12Joint Venture: We then solve for the ﬁrst best level of output under
a joint venture. The welfare function in this case is given by








The ﬁrst order condition for the optimal level of output under a joint
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L
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KL − c −
K
2
− µK = 0.
It is straightforward to see, mimicing the argument in footnote 11,
that the outcome is symmetric. Hence the optimal outcome solves




Note that the ﬁrst best outcome involves joint venture formation
since in this case the economy reaps the synergistic gains which are lost
under Cournot competition.21
We can summarize the above discussion to obtain our next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4. (i) Under Cournot competition the ﬁrst best level




(ii) Under a joint venture formation the ﬁrst best level of output
involves a−2c
1+2µ.
(iii) Under both Cournot competition and a joint venture, the optimal
level of output is decreasing in µ.
(iv) The ﬁrst best level of output is greater under a joint venture.
(v) If the government can dictate the market structure as well, then
the ﬁrst best involves joint venture formation.
We then examine if the ﬁrst best outcome characterised above can
be implemented when the government cannot directly implement either
13the market structure or the level of output, but can only use the level
of A as a policy tool.
We begin with two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 1. Let AJ denote the optimal abatement tax under a
joint venture. Thus AJ is that level of A for which the level of output
under a joint venture is qJ.
Deﬁnition 2. Let AC denote the optimal abatement tax under
Cournot competition. Thus AC is that level of A such that the level of
output under Cournot competition is qC for both the ﬁrms.
We then solve for AJ and AC. Let us ﬁrst solve for AJ.
Recall that the equilibrium level of output under a joint venture is
given by a−A−4c
2 . The objective is to set AJ at such a level that the
equilibrium level of output under a joint venture equals the ﬁrst best
level, qJ. Thus AJ solves the equation a−A−4c
2 = a−2c
1+2µ. Hence it follows
that
AJ =







We then solve for AC. Recall that under Cournot competition the










2(1+2µ). Hence we have that
AC =











We then check whether the optimal values of AJ and AC equals the
marginal social damage or not. Note that in this case the marginal social
damage equals 2µQ, where Q denotes the optimal level of the aggregate
output.
First recall that under a joint venture AJ =
a(2µ−1)−8µc
2µ+1 and 2µQ =
2µ(a−2c)
1+2µ . It is thus clear that under a joint venture the optimal level of
tax, AJ is strictly less than the marginal social damage,
2µ(a−2c)
1+2µ .









1+2µ . It is thus clear that under Cournot competition






Thus under both market forms we ﬁnd that the optimal tax rate
is less than the marginal social damage evaluated at the optimal level
of output. This is the same result as obtained by Buchanan (1969) in
the context of monopoly, and by Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996)
in an oligopolistic context. The intuition is also the same. Note that
under both Cournot competition and joint venture the output level is
less than optimum. Now suppose the abatement tax is set equal to
the marginal damage. Then the abatement tax will reduce the already
sub-optimal level of output. Thus any gain in welfare due to reduced
pollution may be outweighed by the welfare loss due to reduced output.
This implies that complete internalisation of the external damages may
not be desirable, but rather that optimal policy requires an abatement
tax that is less than marginal damages.
The next proposition follows straightaway from the preceding dis-
cussion.
Proposition 5. (i) Both AJ and AC are increasing in µ.
(ii) AJ < AC.
(iii) Under a joint venture the optimal level of tax, AJ is strictly less
than the marginal social damage,
2µ(a−2c)
1+2µ .
(iv) Under Cournot competition the optimal level of tax, AC is strictly





The intuition for Proposition 5(ii) is simple. Recall that under
Cournot competition there is a tendency for the output level to be higher
compared to that under a joint venture. Hence optimally the govern-
ment sets AC to be greater than AJ so as to discourage production
under Cournot competition.
Having solved for the ﬁrst best outcome, we then examine if the ﬁrst
best outcome can be implemented in the following sense. Suppose that
15the government can only set the level of the abatement tax A. Given
the level of A, the ﬁrms endogenously determine the market structure
and the level of output. In such a scenario can the government, just
through manipulating A, ensure that the market structure and the level
of output is optimal?
There are several cases to consider.
Case 1. AJ ≤ A∗.
Case 2. A∗ < AJ < AC.
Recall that there is joint venture formation if and only if A ≤ A∗.
Thus in Case 1, if the government sets A = AJ, then the outcome
involves joint venture formation. Moreover, the output is also at the
ﬁrst best level i.e. qJ. However, in Case 2, if the government sets A =
AJ, then the outcome involves Cournot competition and the ﬁrst best
outcome cannot be implemented.
Summarising the above discussion, we obtain our ﬁnal proposition.
Proposition 6. The ﬁrst best outcome can be implemented if and
only if AJ ≤ A∗. In that case the optimal policy involves setting A = AJ.
Recall that AJ is increasing in µ. Hence implementing the ﬁrst best
outcome is possible provided µ is small, not otherwise.
As Proposition 6 demonstrates, under some parameter conditions the
ﬁrst best outcome cannot be implemented. There are now two natural
questions to ask. First, can the ﬁrst best outcome be implemented if
one expands the set of feasible policies that the government is allowed
to pursue? Second, if the government is not allowed to use any other
policy apart from setting abatement taxes, then what is the second best
level of A?
We then turn to solving the ﬁrst question. Recall that the ﬁrst best
outcome cannot be implemented if A∗ < AJ. If the government sets
A = AJ then the outcome involves Cournot competition, rather than
joint venture formation. Now suppose the government taxes the ﬁrms
if they pursue Cournot competition. If the tax is high enough then
16even for A = AJ there will be joint venture formation and the ﬁrst best
outcome is implemented. Moreover, since the tax is a transfer from ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 2 to the government, the welfare level is not aﬀected. (In
fact, in equilibrium, the tax is not paid at all.) Thus if, in addition to
setting the abatement tax A, the government is allowed to impose lump
sum taxes, that are contingent on the market structure, then the ﬁrst
best outcome can always be implemented.
In fact, the ﬁrst best outcome can also be implemented if the govern-
ment is allowed to provide lump sum subsidies that are contingent on
the market structure. In that case, however, implementing the ﬁrst best
may involve actually paying out subsidies. If the government is revenue
constrained, then such a policy may not be feasible. However, if, for
political or informational reasons, such taxes are not feasible, then one
must solve for the second best policies. We then turn to this task.
Consider the case where A∗ < AJ < AC. There are two sub cases to
consider.
Case 2(a). If WCC(AC) > WJV (A∗), then the second best outcome
involves setting A = Ac, when the outcome involves Cournot competi-
tion. (See Figure 4.)
Case 2(b). If WCC(AC) ≤ WJV (A∗), then the second best outcome
involves setting A = A∗, when the outcome involves a joint venture. (See
Figure 5.)
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that even the second best level of abatement
tax is less than the marginal social damage. In fact, in Case 2(b), the
optimal abatement tax is even less than AC, and is diﬀerent from the
optimal tax under both joint venture and Cournot competition.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of environmental policy in a duopoly
framework where the ﬁrms endogenously decide whether to form a joint
venture, or opt for Cournot competition. We ﬁnd that several conclu-
sions of interest emerge.
17Our analysis shows that the pollution level depends on both gov-
ernment regulation and market structure. Apart from its direct eﬀect
on the pollution level, environmental regulation may aﬀect the level
of pollution indirectly, via the market structure. We ﬁnd that if the
synergistic eﬀect is large, then stricter governmental regulations could
lead to a regime switch from joint venture to Cournot competition, thus
causing the level of pollution to increase. This result suggests that the
issue of market structure needs to be carefully addressed while analysing
environmental policy.
We also derive some interesting welfare results. We ﬁnd that if the
industry is not too polluting, then the ﬁrst best outcome (which in-
volves joint formation) can be implemented through manipulating the
level of abatement taxes alone. In case the industry is polluting, the
second best level of abatement tax may or may not equal the optimal
tax under either joint venture or Cournot competition. Moreover, for a
given market structure, the optimal tax is less than the marginal social
damage.
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss some robustness issues.
First, in our framework the alternative to joint venture formation
involves quantity competition. This immediately raises the question as
to whether our results go through if, instead, the ﬁrms compete over
prices. Fortunately our analysis, not reported here, shows that they do.
Second, note that the proﬁt-sharing rule in a joint venture is taken
to be exogenously given (and symmetric). However, given the symmetry
of our model, most formulations that allow the proﬁt-sharing rule to be
endogenously determined should lead to a symmetric rule.
Third, in this paper we assume that the ﬁrms are symmetric. Again,
our analysis, not reported here, shows that very similar results go through
even if we assume that the ﬁrms are asymmetric, in the sense that
w1 6= r2 and w2 6= r1, or if the abatement technology is diﬀerent for the
two ﬁrms.
Fourth, in this paper we assume that the technology is exogenously
given, so that a change in the emission tax leads to changes in output
levels, rather than the emissions technology. An alternative formulation
would be to consider the case where changes in the emission tax lead to
18changes in the technology, as well. However, our results go through as
long as changing the existing technology is relatively costly.
Finally, while our analysis does use explicit functional forms, we
believe that the use of functional forms is not critical. Given the strong
intuitive content of most of the results, most of these should go through
in a more general framework.
19Endnotes
1. For example, Hergert and Morris (1998) mention that the number of US-
EEC joint ventures increased from less than 10 in 1979, to more than 190 in 1985.
Since then the rate of joint venture formation has, in fact, increased dramatically.
See Hergert and Morris (1998) and Pekar and Allio (1994) for surveys of this phe-
nomenon.
2. See, among others, Baumol and Oates (1998).
3. See, for example, Buchanan (1969).
4. See, among others, Carraro and Soubeyran (1996), Conrad and Wang (1993)
and Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996).
5. See Miller et al. (1996).
6. Here capital (respectively labour) is a shorthand for all factors of production
which the MNC (respectively the domestic ﬁrm) can access relatively cheaply.
7. For example, evidence presented by the European Commission regarding the
European carbon tax, based on research carried out by several research institutes,
suggest that even a very high carbon tax achieves only half of the required reduction
target. See, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994).
8. This replicates the result obtained by Buchanan (1969) in case of monopoly,
and by Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1996) in case of oligopoly.
9. The basic model draws on Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury (2001). Roy
Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury (2001) is, of course, concerned with the theory of
joint venture life-cycles in a non-polluting industry.
10. We can think of this as an emission tax. Suppose that the level of emission is
a linear function of output E = pqi. Let the emission tax take the form of αE = αpqi.
For A = αp we obtain equation (6).
11. Alternatively, one can assume that there is no moral hazard problem, but
that joint venture formation involves some exogenous cost, e.g. cost of having a joint
venture headquarter, etc. This does not aﬀect our results qualitatively.






2 (a − A)
8
< 0.
The argument for ﬁrm 2 is symmetric.
13. Suppose to the contrary there is a non-symmetric equilibrium (L,K). With-





− 1] − c = 0. Since
L > K, it follows that K
2 [ a−A
2q − 1] − c < 0. This, however, violates equation (10).





15. We thus adopt the tie-breaking rule that in case of indiﬀerence the ﬁrms
prefer to opt for joint venture formation. One can, however, adopt a diﬀerent tie-
breaking rule without aﬀecting the analysis in any signiﬁcant way.
16. Clearly, Z0(A) < 0, if and only if A < a − 2c + 16[(bc)
1
2 − c]. Because of
synergy b > c, so that (bc)
1
2 − c > 0. Moreover, since the joint venture output is
positive we have that A < a − 4c. Hence A < a − 4c < a − 2c + 16[(bc)
1
2 − c]. Thus
Z0(A) < 0.
17. We provide an example to show that the various conditions required for our
analysis are consistent. Let a = 13c, b = 9c and A = 2c. For these parameter values
observe that a − A − 4c > 0, a − A − 2(bc)1/2 > 0, ˆ A = c > 0 and Z(A) > 0.
2018. From equation (20), A−a+2(9c−8
√
bc) < 0. Therefore, a−2(9c−8
√
bc) >
A∗. Hence the result.
19. It is clear that for b A = A∗ the level of pollution is continuously decreasing
in A.
20. Of course, if the MNC repatriates its proﬁt to its home country, then the
producers’ surplus would only include the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm. Depending on
the context, either of these assumptions could be the relevant one. For simplicity,
we choose to focus on the ﬁrst one.
21. Note that, for the same level of output, the welfare level under joint venture
formation is higher. This is because the level of consumers’ surplus and pollution
damages is the same under Cournot competition and joint venture (since the output
level is the same), however, because of synergy, the aggregate proﬁt under a joint
venture is greater. Hence, the maximal level of welfare under a joint venture exceeds
that under Cournot competition.
21References
Barrett, S., 1994. “Strategic environmental policy and international
trade.” Journal of Public Economics, 54: 325-38.
Baumol, W.J., and W.E. Oates, 1998. The Theory of Environmental
Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J.M., 1969. “External diseconomies, corrective taxes and
market structure.” American Economic Review, 59: 174-177.
Carraro, C., and D. Siniscalco, 1994. “ Technical innovation and
environmental protection, environmental policy reconsidered: the role
of technological innovation.” European Economic Review, 38: 545-554.
Carraro, C., and A. Soubeyran, 1996. “Environmental feedback and
optimal taxation in oligopoly, economic policy for the environmental
and natural resources: techniques for the management and control of
pollution,” in A. Xepapadeas (ed.), New Horizons in Environmental
Economics Series. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Conrad, K., and J. Wang, 1993. “The eﬀect of emission taxes and
abatement subsidies on market structure.” International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 11: 499-518.
Hergert, M., and D.Morris, 1998. “Trends in international collabo-
rative business,” in F.J. Contractor and P. Lorange (eds.), Cooperative
Strategies in International Business. Lexington Books.
Katsoulacos, Y., and A. Xepapadeas, 1995. “Environmental pol-
icy under oligopoly with endogenous market structure.” Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 97: 411-420.
Katsoulacos, Y., and A. Xepapadeas, 1996. “Emission taxes and
market structure,” in C. Carraro, Y. Katsoulacos and A. Xepapadeas
(eds.), Environmental Policy and Market Structure. Dordrecht, Boston
and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kolstad, C.D., 2000. Environmental Economics. New York Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Miller, R.R. et. al., 1996. “International joint ventures in developing
countries: happy marriages?” Discussion paper no. 29, International
Finance Corporation, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Pekar, P., and R. Allio, 1994. “Making alliances work - guideline for
success.” Long Range Planning, 27: 54-65.
Roy Chowdhury, I., and P. Roy Chowdhury, 2001. “ A theory of joint
venture life-cycles.” International Journal of Industrial Organization,
19: 319-343.
22Ulph, A., 1996a. “Environmental policy and international trade
when governments and producers act strategically.” Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management, 30: 265-281.
Ulph, A., 1996b. “Environmental policy instruments and imper-
fectly competitive international trade.” Environmental and Resource
Economics, 7: 333-355.
Zanetti, G., and A. Abate, 1993. “Salvaguardia dell’ambiente presso
le maggiori impresse mondiali,” in D. Siniscalco (ed.), Stato, Grandi
Empresse e Sviluppo Sostenibile. Bologna: Il Munlino.
2324
    Z(A)
         Joint  Venture                                Cournot Competition
A
*                                                                                                A
                                                                                                         
Figure 125
Â>A*
                                                                                                               q
JV
                                                                                                                         2q
C
                                              A
*                                         Â              A
                                                                                                                        — —
C
         Joint Venture                  Cournot Competition  — —JV JV
A
*                                                           A
Figure 2:  Discrete Upward Jump in Pollution26
Â<A*
                                                                                                      q
JV
                                                                                                       2q
C
                                    Â       A
*                                                                        A
                                                                                                       — —
C
— —JV JV
           Joint Venture                 Cournot Competition
                                            A
*                                                         A
Figure 3:  Discrete Downward Jump in Pollution27
A
* < AJ <AC,
WCC (AC) > WJ (A
*)
          WJ                                 WCC
    Joint Venture                 Cournot Competition
                          A*                                             A                         A
Figure 4:  Second-Best Outcome28
A
* < AJ <AC,
WC (AC) < WJ (A
*)
WJ                                   WCC
    Joint Venture                 Cournot Competition
          A
*          AJ             AC           A
Figure 5: Second Based Outcome